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Communication Without the Cooperative Principle
A Signaling Experiment
Abstract According to Grice’s ‘Cooperative Principle’, human communica-
tors are involved in a cooperative endeavor. The speaker attempts to make
herself understood and the listener, in turn, assumes that the speaker is trying
to maximize the ease and effectiveness of communication. While pragmatists
recognize that people do not always behave in such a way, the Cooperative
Principle is generally assumed to hold. However, it is often the case that the
interests of speakers and listeners diverge, at least to some degree. Communi-
cation can arise in such situations when the cost of signaling is high enough
that it aligns the interests of speaker and listener, but what happens when the
cost of signaling is not sufficient to align the interests of those communicat-
ing? In these cases the theoretical prediction is that they will reach a partially
informative system of communication. Using methods from experimental eco-
nomics, we test whether theoretical predictions are borne out. We find that
subjects do learn to communicate without the cooperative principle.
Keywords Cooperative Principle · Game Theory · Experimental Philosophy ·
Philosophy of Language
1 Introduction
“Our talk exchanges...are characteristically, to some degree at least,
cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some
extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually
accepted direction.” (Grice, 1991, p. 26)
In the quote above, Grice elaborates what he calls the ‘Cooperative Principle’—
that participants in human communication usually are involved in a cooper-
ative endeavor. The speaker attempts to make herself understood and the
listener, in turn, assumes that the speaker is trying to maximize the ease and
2effectiveness of communication. While Grice recognizes that humans do not
always behave in such a way, he and others studying the pragmatics of human
communication assume that the Cooperative Principle will generally hold.
In contrast, economists and social scientists who employ game theory to
study human communication often seem to assume the opposite—that to at
least some degree the interests of speakers and listeners diverge. Examples of
communication under divergent interests include job hunters and companies
looking to hire, or firms planning to go public and those who might buy stock.
Outside the realm of economic behavior, one can find many further examples
of such situations—people on first dates, teenagers and their parents, students
and their teachers, bosses and lazy employees. One of the major findings of
the game theoretic literature on this topic is that when signals are costly,
and when those sending the signals pay differential costs to do so, honest
communication can arise in spite of divergent interests (Spence, 1973). In such
cases, the costs for signaling remove conflict of interest between the sender
and receiver. In other words, communication is possible in such situations as
long as costs ensure that actors are incentivized to adhere to the Cooperative
Principle. We will say more about this later in the paper.
Recently, philosophers have begun to investigate the emergence of com-
munication when interests diverge as well. The traditional game theoretic ap-
proach to behavior uses assumptions of rationality to predict strategic choice.
Evolutionary game theory, on the other hand, looks at how actors come to
behave strategically through learning (or natural selection, in the biologi-
cal world). This approach has been favored by many philosophers as a more
wholistic way to understand human behavior, including human communica-
tion.1 In particular, philosophers have recently employed evolutionary game
theoretic models to show that a type of partially communicative equilbria,
usually ignored by economists, arises commonly when actors with divergent
interests learn to communicate (Wagner, 2013; Huttegger and Zollman, 2010).
Throughout the paper, we will refer to these partially communicative out-
comes as hybrid equilibria.2 Importantly, in these hybrid equilibria costs to
signalers do not bring the interests of the actors in line. In other words, actors
learn to communicate, even though they are not incentivized to adhere to the
Cooperative Principle, and do not do so at equilibrium.3
In this paper, we investigate the possibility of hybrid equilibria arising in
real scenarios of human communication. We look at groups of actors in ex-
perimental settings to see whether they develop such partially communicative
behavior. We show that, in fact, such outcomes do occur in the lab. This result
1 For recent examples of this sort of work on communication see Skyrms (2010), Barrett
and Zollman (2009), or O’Connor (2014).
2 This follows the use of the term by economists. ‘Hybrid’ is used because such equilibria
have characteristics that are both communicative and non-communicative.
3 We are careful with our wording here because, of course, humans may adhere to coop-
erative conversational norms even when it is not in their material interests. In such cases,
the Cooperative Principle will hold, though it is not consistent with equilibrium behavior
in a game. As we will argue, there are important cases where humans transfer information,
but do not follow cooperative norms.
3is perhaps surprising because actors learn to communicate even though their
interests are misaligned.
The paper will proceed as follows. In section 2, we outline the costly sig-
naling model that is employed here and discuss costly and hybrid equilibria
in this model. In section 3, we focus on the recent exploration of hybrid equi-
libria in evolutionary models. Then, in section 4 we describe our experimental
set-up and in section 5 we present our results. In the conclusion we briefly dis-
cuss work on the pragmatics of human communication when the Cooperative
Principle does not hold.
2 The Model
Costly signaling has been studied both in economics and in evolutionary bi-
ology, starting with Spence (1973) and Zahavi (1975). Phenomena from eco-
nomic interactions, to sexual selection, to predator-prey signaling, to parent-
offspring conflict have been studied under this heading (Searcy and Nowicky,
2005). Theoretical models of these situations share some important features.
In such partial conflict of interest signaling models, two players have the option
to transfer information. A sender has a certain type, and has the option to
either send a signal to an uninformed receiver about this type, or not to. The
sender has an incentive to sometimes, but not always, reveal the information
to the receiver, whereas the receiver would always like to be fully informed.
The models show that, whenever these requirements hold, there is no reliable
information transfer between sender and receiver unless signals are ‘costly’,
meaning that the sender must pay something to send them.
The game shown in figure 1 illustrates this idea. This is taken from Zollman
et al. (2013), and is also the game employed in the experiments we describe
below.4 In figure 1 you can see the extensive form representation of a situation
of communication with potential conflicts of interest. The first move is made
by ‘nature’ who chooses whether the sender is of type T1 or type T2. The
sender can then either send a signal or abstain from doing so. The cost of the
signal varies with the type of the sender: c1 if the sender is of type T1 and c2
if she is of type T2. The receiver observes the signal, but cannot observe the
type of the sender. She can choose between two actions, A1 and A2.
Players’ incentives are aligned, in this game, if the sender is of type T1,
and they are misaligned otherwise. When the sender is of type T1, then both
players prefer A1 over A2. When the sender is of type T2, however, the receiver
prefers choosing A2 over choosing A1 while the sender still wants her to choose
A1.
In table 1 we list all the pure strategies of this game. If the sender chooses
strategy S1 and the receiver chooses strategy R1, the signal carries information
about sender type. In this case, senders signal only when type T1 and receivers
only choose A1 when they receive a signal. This strategy profile is not a Nash
4 Though, as we will outline, we must shift the payoffs of the game to accord with exper-
imental practice.
4Fig. 1 A partial conflict of interest signaling game with differential costs.
Label Description
S1 Signal if T1 and don’t signal if T2
S2 Signal always
S3 Never signal
S4 Signal if T2 and don’t signal if T1
R1 A1 if signal is observed, A2 otherwise
R2 A2 always
R3 A1 always
R4 A2 if signal, A1 otherwise
Table 1 All possible pure strategies in game pictured in figure 1 for senders, S, and re-
ceivers, R.
equilibrium when signals are cheap, e.g. c1 = c2 = 0. Since receivers choose
A1 in response to the signal, then senders also want to use the signal when
type T2 in order to obtain their preferred outcome. Thus, the sender has an
incentive to choose another strategy.
For certain higher values of c, S1 and R1 will be a Nash equilibrium. As
long as the type T1 pays a signal cost of c1 < 1, it is strictly in her interest
to signal in order to ensure that the receiver takes action A1. Also, as long as
type T2 pays a cost c2 > 1 for signaling, then it is strictly in her interest not
to signal; the cost of the signal outweighs the benefit obtained by getting the
receiver to choose A1. Hence, if
c1 < 1 < c2 (1)
the strategy profile where the sender chooses S1 and the receiver chooses R1
is a Nash equilibrium. This is often called a ‘separating equilibrium’. It is
also known as a ‘costly signaling equilibrium’ since it is the fact that c2 is
sufficiently high that allows reliable signaling to be stable.
5These considerations lead to the ‘costly signaling hypothesis’ mentioned
above: In situations of partial conflict of interest, informative signaling is pos-
sible only if there are signals of sufficiently high costs for some types. There
is an important connection between this hypothesis and Grice’s ‘Cooperative
Principle’, as discussed in the introduction. The effect of introducing costs is
to align the interests of the players. In order to see what we mean by this,
consider again the game in figure 1. As long as both costs are equal to zero,
there is conflict of interest between receivers and type T2 senders. However,
if (1) holds, the preferences of the two players align and so the sender wants
to reveal her type. That is, the sender prefers to signal when type T1 and not
to signal when T2 (strategy S1). This is the sense in which the Cooperative
Principle holds in costly signaling games: when costs are high senders prefer
a strategy that maximizes the ease and effectiveness of communication.5
Besides the signaling equilibrium, there are two further types of equilib-
ria in costly signaling games. There are always pooling equilibria where the
sender never uses the costly signal. While these equilibria are interesting and
important, they will not play a significant role in our experiment, which was
designed to investigate the other type of equilibrium, known as a ‘hybrid equi-
librium’. The hybrid equilibrium for the game of figure 1 is shown in figure 2.
In the hybrid equilibrium, a sender always sends the signal if she is of type T1.
Otherwise, she sends the signal with probability α and does not send the signal
with probability 1−α. The receiver always chooses A2 upon not receiving the
signal. If she receives the signal, then she chooses A1 with probability β and
A2 with probability 1 − β. Hence, the hybrid equilibrium is a mixed equilib-
rium where the sender mixes between strategies S1 and S2 and the receiver
mixes between R1 and R2. It can be shown that the hybrid equilibrium exists
whenever
0 < c2 < 1 and c1 ≤ c2. (2)
In other words, when the cost to T2 is less than one, but the cost to T1 is
even less than this, the hybrid equilibrium will exist. In this case, the hybrid
equilibrium is located at β = c2 and α = x/(1 − x), where x is the prior
probability of type T1 (see Zollman et al., 2013).
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The idea of the hybrid equilibrium is that the sender sometimes signals
reliably and sometimes she does not. In order to account for the latter part
of the sender’s overall strategy, the receiver does not always choose the pre-
ferred action of the sender (A1). Thus, there is information transfer between
the players at the hybrid equilibrium, but it is not perfect. Importantly, in-
formation transfer is possible even though the cost c2 is too low to align the
players’ interests. The hybrid equilibrium is a case where the costly signaling
5 Of course, as noted, sender and receiver interests are not perfectly aligned over possible
receiver strategies. Senders prefer that the receiver always take action A1 (strategy R2),
while receivers prefer to only take action A1 when senders are type T1 (strategy R1). What
is important is that the cost of the signal aligns sender and receiver interest over the sender’s
strategy, ensuring that signals perfectly communicate sender type.
6 Prior probability here refers to the likelihood that a sender will be of type T1. Here this
probability will be hashed out as the proportion of T1 types in the experimental population.
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Fig. 2 Illustration of the hybrid equilibrium.
hypothesis does not hold and the Cooperative Principle fails. Yet there still is
information in the signal sent by the sender.
3 Evolution and the Hybrid Equilibrium
Standard costly signaling equilibria face a number of problems. Some of them
are empirical. When one measures the actual costs in biological scenarios of
sending purportedly costly signals, they often turn out to be negligible.7 There
is also theoretical work that weighs against the significance of costly signaling
equilibria (Huttegger and Zollman, 2010; Wagner, 2013; Zollman et al., 2013).8
In particular, the costly signaling equilibria of many different costly signaling
games does not seem to be very significant from the point of view of the evo-
lutionary replicator dynamics. The replicator dynamics is a simple system of
ordinary differential equations describing a selection process among strategies
of a game. Under these dynamics, strategies are played by members of a very
large population who repeatedly interact at random with each other. Strategies
with an above average payoff increase in frequency, while those with a below
average payoff decrease in frequency (for details, see Hofbauer and Sigmund,
1998).
For various costly signaling games (including the game of figure 1), the
hybrid equilibrium fares better under the replicator dynamics (Huttegger and
Zollman, 2010; Wagner, 2013; Zollman et al., 2013). This has to do with the
fact that the costs required for the hybrid equilibrium can be quite small—a
fact that is also relevant from an empirical standpoint, as these small costs
are more in line with observed costs of real world signaling in many cases.
For the replicator dynamics, the hybrid equilibrium is dynamically stable and
attracts a significant portion of initial conditions of the state space. In short,
7 See Searcy and Nowicky (2005) as well as references in Zollman et al. (2013).
8 These theoretical issues arise from dynamical considerations and, as such, have been
ignored when only the equilibrium properties of a game are analyzed. For a methodological
discussion of the equilibrium analysis versus dynamical analysis see Huttegger and Zollman
(2013). For an example of a case where equilibrium analyses are misleading see O’Connor
(2015).
7this means that many evolving populations should be expected to arrive at a
state where all actors play the hybrid equilibrium. While the replicator dy-
namics makes specific assumptions about the underlying dynamical process,
its qualitative features hold across a large number of dynamical models for
evolution and learning. We therefore take these results about the hybrid equi-
librium as providing theoretical predictions that will hold qualitatively across
many cases of learning and evolution.
As will become clear below, in our experiment, subjects have an opportu-
nity to learn to play the game in figure 1 with a group. We predict similar
dynamical outcomes for this evolutionary scenario. While (1) holds, the in-
terests of receivers and senders of type T2 will be sufficiently aligned to allow
for the signal to communicate sender type. When (2) holds, the interests of
receivers and type T2 senders are not aligned, but we predict partial commu-
nication of sender type.
In the remainder of the paper we study the significance of the hybrid
equilibrium from an empirical perspective.
4 Experimental Set-Up
Subjects in our experiment played the differential cost game in figure 1. The
payoffs shown in this figure were chosen for ease of explanation. For the ex-
periment, as described below, these payoffs had to be modified slightly, but
the structure of the game was maintained. The experiment consisted of both
an experimental and control treatment which differed in the cost of signaling
for type T2 and sender’s payoff for A2. In the experimental treatment, these
values were such that the interests of receivers and type T2 senders were not
aligned. In the control, these values were such that the interests of receivers
and type T2 senders were sufficiently aligned to allow for full communication.
These treatments will be described in more detail below.
There were a total of 12 sessions (eight sessions of the experimental treat-
ment and four sessions of the control treatment) each of which involved 12
participants. The subject pool consisted of undergraduate and graduate stu-
dents from the University of California, Irvine who were recruited from the
Experimental Social Science Laboratory subject pool via email solicitation.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007).
At the start of each session, experimental subjects were asked to sit at a
randomly assigned computer terminal where they were presented with a set of
instructions. The set of instructions provided subjects with knowledge of the
game and the payment structure employed. These instructions were designed
to give players only enough knowledge of the experimental set-up to make
8strategic decisions.9 Deviations from complete knowledge of the game will be
noted as the experimental set-up is described below.
In each session, six participants were randomly assigned to be senders
(referred to as ‘Role 1’ in the experiment) and six to be receivers (referred
to as ‘Role 2’). Of the senders, two were assigned the type T1 (referred to as
‘Blue’) and four were assigned the type T2 (referred to as ‘Red’). Receivers
were aware that there were two possible sender types, but were unaware of
the proportion of types within the sender population. Senders were aware that
there may be other types within the sender population, but were not given
any information about the other type.
Each session consisted of 60 rounds. In every round, each sender was ran-
domly paired with a receiver. Each round consisted of two stages. In the first
stage, each sender was asked if they would like to signal to the receiver. The
signal was the “!” symbol, which was chosen so as to not have any intuitive
connection with sender type. For type T1, this signal was costless. For type
T2, the signal cost was 1 during the experimental treatment and 2 during the
control. Each sender type was aware of the cost for their type, but not aware
of the cost for the other type. Receivers were not aware of the signal costs.
In the second stage, receivers were told whether the sender had sent the
“!” signal or not and were then asked to choose action A1 or A2 (described as
guessing the sender was Blue or Red, respectively). Receivers got a payoff of
3 if they choose the action A1 when matched with type T1 sender or if they
chose A2 when matched with a type T2 sender, and a payoff of 0 otherwise.
Senders received a payoff of 3 when receivers chose A1 and a lower payoff when
receivers chose A2. In the experimental treatment, the sender’s payoff for A2
was 1 and in the control the payoff was 2. If a type T2 sender chose to send
a signal, the cost of the signal was subtracted to yield a final payoff for the
round. Each participant was only aware of their possible payoffs, not of the
payoffs for other roles or types.
As noted above, these costs are slightly different than those shown in figure
1, though the structure of the game is the same. In the experimental treatment,
the cost for type T2 to signal and the payoff to sender type T2 for A2 were both
1. These numbers were chosen to avoid negative payoffs (type T2’s minimum
payoff occurs when they signal, but the receiver takes action A2, which ends up
being 0). The same reasoning applies in the control, where the cost of signaling
for type T2 and their payoff for A2 are both 2.
For the experimental treatment, the potential benefit for the sender of the
receiver choosing A1 rather than A2 was 2 (a payoff of 3 verses a payoff of
1) whereas the cost of signaling for type T2 was 1. This means that in the
experimental treatment, type T2 senders could benefit from signaling given
that there was a sufficiently large chance of receivers choosing A2 upon receipt
of a signal. Since receivers would benefit from type T2 never signaling, their
interests were not aligned. For the control, the potential benefit for senders
9 This choice is meant to induce a situation where actors are learning from experience,
rather than using high rationality strategies to choose how to behave. See Bruner et al.
(2015) for further justification of this choice in a similar experimental setting.
9of receivers choosing A1 rather than A2 was 1 (3 verses 2) while the cost of
signaling for type T2 was 2. In this treatment, it was in type T2’s interest
to never signal. Since it is also in the receiver’s interest for type T2 to never
signal, their interests were aligned.
At the end of each round, participants were given a summary of the round.
They were told the type of the sender, whether or not a signal was sent, what
action the receiver chose, and their own payoff for the round. Subjects were
not told the payoffs for any other participants or what occurred among any
other sender-receiver pairs.
Subjects received a $7 show-up fee for attending the experiment. In ad-
dition, they were paid for three randomly selected rounds of the experiment.
Subjects earned $1 for each point they received in these randomly selected
rounds. These rounds were not chosen from the first 10 rounds in order to
allow time for learning. This payment structure allowed participants to make
up to $9 in addition to the $7 show-up fee, for a total of $16 maximum. This
method of payment was designed to minimize both risky (non-optimal) behav-
ior and wealth accumulation effects (see Bruner et al. (2015) for details on this
sort of payment structure). Subjects were paid in cash immediately following
each session.
5 Results
Given the set-up described above, we expect that in the experimental treat-
ment groups will evolve toward the hybrid equilibrium and groups in the con-
trol treatment will evolve toward the separating (costly signaling) equilibrium.
We use two steps to determine whether the results are consistent with this pre-
diction.
First, we compare the results from the experimental and control treat-
ments. The goal here is to use the control treatment as a baseline to establish
that, in fact, the experimental subjects are transferring information less per-
fectly than their counterparts. In particular, we will see that in the control
treatment both signals and non-signals carry near perfect information about
sender type, while in the experimental treatment there is near perfect infor-
mation about type when the signal is absent, but not when the signal is sent.
Second, we determine if information is in fact being transferred when the
signal is sent in the experimental treatment. To perform this second step, we
compare the experimental treatment to a null hypothesis that the experimental
actors are failing to transfer information at all. In particular, we check whether
there is any correlation between sender types and signaling or between receipt
of a signal and receiver’s guess of sender type. If a sender of type T1 is more
likely to signal than type T2, and receivers in turn are more like to take action
A1 when the signal is present than when it is absent, we can conclude that
the signal is partially informative.
In making these comparisons, we use the average behavior of groups. Since
we are testing whether groups will reach the hybrid equilibrium by the end of
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the experiment, we look at data from round 50 to 60 of the experiment. We
use t-tests to evaluate the significance of our results. In a t-test, the behavior
of each group is treated as a data point and the variance among these data
points is taken into account.
5.1 Comparison to Control
Recall that there are two ways the hybrid equilibrium differs from the sep-
arating equilibrium. First, while type T2 will never signal in the separating
equilibrium, they will sometimes signal in the hybrid equilibrium. Second,
while receivers will always take action A1 in response to a signal in the sepa-
rating equilibrium, they will sometimes take action A2 in response to a signal
in the hybrid equilibrium. Otherwise, the predictions for both treatments are
the same. To test whether the results of the experimental treatment differ as
predicted from the separating equilibrium, we compare to the control treat-
ment. This gives a more accurate picture of which deviations from perfect
communication are due to subjects making occasional errors and which can
be attributed to the existence of the hybrid equilibrium.
 T1 signals T2 does 
not signal 
(1-α) 
A1 taken 
after signal 
(β) 
A2 taken 
after no 
signal 
Control 93.2 96.0 79.8 91.5 
Experimental 90.4 71.9 63.4 84.8 
Significance 0.24 0.0014 0.052 0.055 
 
Table 2 A comparison of the experimental and control treatments. Percentages and p-
values are shown. 1− α and β are defined in figure 2.
Prediction 1 (Sender Behavior): There will be no difference between the
control and experimental treatments for type T1 choosing to signal. In
the control treatment type T2 will never signal and in the experimental
treatment type T2 will sometimes signal.
We performed a one-tailed t-test to determine whether type T1 signaled
significantly less often in the experimental treatment than in the control. As
table 2 shows, we find no significant difference between control and experi-
mental treatments for type T1 senders choosing to signal.
We again performed a one-tailed t-test to determine whether type T2 sig-
naled significantly more often in the experimental treatment than in the con-
trol. The result is significant at the < 0.002 level, as seen in table 2. Figure 3
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shows the percentage of type T2 signalers that do not signal in both the exper-
imental and control treatments. Data points were calculated by determining
the percentage of type T2 signalers that fail to send the signal in the span of
ten rounds. As figure 3 indicates, in the control treatment signalers of type T2
quickly learned not to send the signal. Signalers of type T2 in the experimental
treatment, on the other hand, increased the rate at which they sent the signal
until round 40, at which point they failed to send the signal approximately
70% of the time for the remainder of the experiment. To be perfectly clear,
this behavior clearly accords with our predictions. We now turn our attention
to the receiver’s response to the signal.
Fig. 3 Percentage of time type T2 senders do not signal for both experimental and control
treatments. Results were averaged over four runs for the control treatment and five runs for
the experimental treatment. Data points are calculated for every ten rounds.
Prediction 2 (Receiver Behavior): In the control treatment receivers will
always take action A1 in response to the signal and in the experimental
treatment receivers will only sometimes take action A1 in response to
the signal. There will be no difference between the control and experi-
mental treatments for receivers taking A2 upon receipt of the signal.
Qualitatively, the results accord with prediction in that receiver behavior
differed more significantly in response to A1 and less significantly in response
to A2 across the treatments. In particular, receivers were about 16 percentage
points less likely to take A1 in response to the signal in the experimental
treatment and only about 7 percentage points less likely to take action A2.
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We performed a one-tailed t-test to determine whether receivers took action A1
in response to the signal significantly less often in the experimental treatment
than in the control. As seen in table 2, we are not able to conclude that this
difference is significant, although the difference is close to being significant
at p ≈ 0.052. Similarly, a one-tailed t-test shows that difference for receivers
taking A2 when there is no signal is not significant, but is close to being
significant at p ≈ 0.055.
We cannot conclude from the significance tests that Prediction 2 is sup-
ported, but we can see from figure 4 that there are two different trends in
receiver response to the signal. Figure 4 displays the percentage of the time
receivers took action A1 conditional on the sender having sent the signal. In
the control treatment, the graph shows an upward trend as receivers learned to
take action A1 in response to the signal. This upward trend was not observed
in the experimental treatment.
Fig. 4 Percentage of time receivers take action A1 in response to the signal for both control
and experimental treatments. Results were averaged over four runs for the control treatment
and five runs for the experimental treatment. Data points are calculated for every ten rounds.
Generally, across treatments we found that senders tended to learn a sig-
naling strategy first and receivers learned to respond more slowly. Comparing
figures 3 and 4 shows that receiver behavior was much more varied than sender
behavior. Thus, there is reason to think that receivers were still learning when
the experiment ended.
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For this reason, we provide figure 5. This figure shows the behavior we
would expect the receivers to arrive at if they were to continue learning in the
same fashion for another 60 rounds.10
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Fig. 5 Trend lines extending receiver behavior to 120 rounds.
We can see from figure 5 that, using trendlines, in the control we predict
receivers will continue taking action A1 more often in response to the signal
than in the experimental treatment, while in both treatments we predict that
receivers will learn to take action A2 in absence of the signal.
To summarize, we see a significant difference in sender behavior across
control and experimental treatments with the experimental treatments better
conforming to the hybrid equilibrium. We do not see a significant difference in
receiver behavior across treatments, though if we extrapolate observed learning
trends we predict that such a difference would arise.
5.2 Comparison to Independence
The second step in determining whether results are consistent with the hybrid
equilibrium predictions is to check whether there is still some information
transferred when the signal is sent.
10 A trend line is constructed by first using a regression on the data for the first 60 rounds
to find the equation that best describes the receiver’s learning behavior. This equation is
then used to predict receiver learning for the next 60 rounds. We found that a logarithmic
regression best describes receiver learning in our experiment in terms of providing the largest
R2 values. This indicates that receivers learn quickly at first, then slow down over time.
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Prediction 3 (Information Transfer): The presence of a signal will con-
tain some information about sender type in experimental treatments.
The most natural way of determining whether this prediction is confirmed
is to compare the experimental results with a null hypothesis. In this case,
the null hypothesis is that there is no correlation between sender type and
signaling, and that there is no correlation between signal and receiver choice.11
We predict that, in fact, the signal is sent more frequently by type T1 and that
upon receipt of the signal, receivers are more likely to take action A1.
Again taking data from the rounds 50 to 60, we performed a one-tailed
t-test to see whether type T1 is more likely to send a signal than T2. There is
very strong evidence that sending a signal is dependent on sender type. (This
result is significant at the << 0.0001 level.) We can conclude that the signal
contains information about sender type: receipt of the signal means it is more
likely that a sender is type T1.
We also test whether receivers are sensitive to the information contained
in the signal, or in other words that there is some dependence between receipt
of a signal and action taken. In order to determine whether this is the case, we
compare observed receiver behavior with what a receiver would do if ignoring
the signal. Since there is evidence that subjects in the laboratory setting use
probability matching strategies, we assume that if receivers are ignoring the
signal they take action A1 one-third of the time.
12 We use a one-tailed t-test
to determine whether receivers took action A1 upon receipt of the signal more
than a third of the time and find that the result is significant at the << 0.0001
level.
6 Conclusion
To sum up, we find that under parameter values where the hybrid equilibrium
exists, groups of actors do, in fact, learn to send partially communicative sig-
nals. This result is consistent with what we see in models of such scenarios—a
significant portion of the time, hybrid equilibria evolve. As our results indi-
cate, communication in humans can occur even when interests do not coincide.
This gives reason to think that the Cooperative Principle is a useful idea for
conceptualizing some human communication, but by no means all.
One thing that should be noted, though, is that the purpose of the Co-
operative Principle in pragmatics is to provide background assumptions that
allow humans to read implicature from human conversation. For example, if
you ask, ‘Is Gertie a good worker?’ and I say ‘Gertie has done some good
things since working here’, the implication is that Gertie has also done some
less-than-good things. The reason that we can draw this conclusion has to do
11 For more on the use of this comparison see Blume et al. (1998) and Bruner et al. (2015).
12 For a discussion of the extent to which subjects use probability matching, see Vulkan
(2000). The alternative assumption, that receivers would take action A2 100% of the time,
would only make the comparison to independence results stronger, since we would be asking
if the observed frequency is greater than zero rather than one-third.
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with the assumption that I am generally trying to provide the right amount
and right kinds of information to you.
In recent years, though, it has become clear that pragmatic analysis can be
done even in conflict of interest cases. De Jaegher and van Rooij (2014) provide
an overview of work on pragmatics in conflict of interest signaling that uses
game theory as a framework. Franke et al. (2012) include an analysis of a
number of cases where pragmatic inference is possible in conflict of interest
cases. For example, consider a case where you ask, ‘What time is it?’ and I
reply ‘Sometime after noon.’ Under the Cooperative Principle, it is safe to
assume that I do not know the time because otherwise I would provide you
with further information. If, however, you know that I have access to the time,
you can instead infer that I am unwilling to share it for some reason.
Our results also lends credence to work by previous authors arguing for the
evolutionary importance of hybrid equilibria (Huttegger and Zollman, 2010;
Wagner, 2013; Zollman et al., 2013). In doing so, it may give economists and
biologists a reason to take this sort of signaling outcome more seriously.
This paper is part of a small but growing body of work employing the meth-
ods of experimental economics to study questions of interest to philosophers.
Bruner et al. (2015) and Rubin et al. (2015) use these methods to investigate
the emergence of communication in human groups. We follow these authors
in thinking that these methods can be of great use to experimental philoso-
phers, especially in cases where philosophers already employ game theory as
a framework for understanding strategic interaction in humans.
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